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ABSTRACT 
Lee Archie argued that if any truth values are consistently assigned to a natural language 
conditional to which Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens are valid argumentative forms, and 
affirming the consequent is an invalid argumentative form, this conditional would have the 
same truth conditions than a material implication. This argument is simple and it requires few 
assumptions that are relatively uncontroversial. We show that it is possible to extend Archie’s 
argument to three-valued logics and five-valued logics and vindicate a slightly weaker 
conclusion, but that is still important: even if we would not believe in bivalence and in the 
classical negation operator, we would still have good reasons to accept that natural language 
conditionals and the material implication share truth conditions. 
1. ARCHIE’S ARGUMENT 
Lee Archie (1979) held that natural language conditionals with the form “If P then Q” are 
logically equivalent to the material implication “P ⊃ Q”. His argument relies on circumstance 
surveyors and the following assumptions: when the antecedent of a conditional is true and the 
consequent is false, the conditional is false; Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens have at least 
one substitution instance with true premises and a  true conclusion; affirming the consequent 
have at least one substitution instance  with true premises and a false conclusion; a 
conditional is truth-functional without any suppositions concerning the assignment of its truth 
values. 
He then arbitrarily assigned truth values in the circumstance surveyor as follows: the value 
“1” is assigned when both the antecedent and consequent are true. Due to assumptions, the 
value “F” is assigned when the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. “3” is assigned 
when the antecedent is false and the consequent is true, and the value “4” is assigned when 
both antecedent and consequent are false. According to him, we can justify material 
implication’s truth table with these assumptions alone. Consider Modus Ponens’ circumstance 
surveyor: 
P Q If P then Q P Q
T T 1 T T
T F F T F
F T 3 F T
F F 4 F F
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The first line of the circumstance surveyor above is the only case where Modus Ponens 
has true premises and true conclusion. Therefore “1” must be true. Now consider Modus 
Tollens’ circumstance surveyor: 
The fourth line is the unique circumstance in which Modus Tollens can have true premises 
and true conclusion. Therefore, “4” must be true. However, to fill up the circumstance 
surveyor we still need to justify the third line. Now consider the circumstance surveyor of 
affirming the consequent: 
Since the third line is the unique circumstance in which Affirming the Consequent can have 
true premises and false conclusion, “3” must be true. By doing this he shows that all the lines 
of material implication’s truth table are the same than “if P then Q”. This argument is quite 
simple and it requires few and relatively uncontroversial assumptions, namely the validity of 
Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens, the invalidity of affirming the consequent, the thesis that a 
conditional is false when its antecedent is true and the consequent is false, and the truth-
functional assumption. 
However, it can be objected that the last assumption is circular because some critics of the 
truth-functional hypothesis deny that natural language conditionals have truth values when 
their antecedent is false. In that case, we cannot establish the third and fourth line of the truth 
table. Nevertheless, Archie could reply that the truth-functional assumption in this case is 
indirectly justified by the intuitive process of filling up the truth values that follows from the 
other assumptions. If a conditional does not have a truth value in the third line, we must deny 
the supposition that affirming the consequent must have one instance with true premises and 
false conclusion. In addition, if a conditional does not have a truth value in the fourth line, we 
must deny the supposition that Modus Tollens must have at least one instance with true 
premises and true conclusion. Since both assumptions are plausible, the truth-functional 
assumption is justified. In fact, if a conditional can be true only on the first line of the truth 
table affirming the consequent turns out to be valid, but this cannot be the case, since it is a 
well-known fallacy. 
Notice, though, that to be taken seriously, Archie’s argument assumes the bivalence and 
the classical negation operator. In spite of this, we can extend the circumstance surveyor 
argument and vindicate the same conclusions even if we abandon both assumptions in three 
and five-valued circumstance surveyors. 
P Q If P then Q ¬Q ¬P
T T 1 F F
T F F T F
F T 3 F T
F F 4 T T
P Q If P then Q Q P
T T 1 T T
T F F F T
F T 3 T F
F F 4 F F
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2. EXTENDING THE ARGUMENT TO MANY-VALUED CIRCUMSTANCE 
SURVEYORS 
Consider a truth table from Lukasiewicz’s three-valued logic L3 (Lukasiewicz, 1920). 
Following the same arbitrary assignment of truth values from Archie’s argument, we can add 
the following truth values: “i” for “indeterminate”, “5” when the antecedent is true and the 
consequent is indeterminate; “6” when the antecedent is indeterminate and the consequent is 
true; “7” when both the antecedent and consequent are indeterminate; “8” when the 
antecedent is indeterminate and the consequent is false; “9” when the antecedent is false and 
the consequent is indeterminate. Since this logic has an additional truth value—the 
indeterminate—we also have a different negation operator that works as indicated in the table 
below: 
Having this in mind, consider the following circumstance surveyors: 
                                                     Modus Ponens 
Modus Tollens 
P ¬P
T F
i i
F T
First premise Second 
premise
Conclusion
P Q If P then Q P Q
T T 1 T T
T i 5 T i
T F F T F
i T 6 i T
i i 7 i i
i F 8 i F
F T 3 F T
F i 9 F i
F F 4 F F
First premise Second 
premise
Conclusion
P Q If P then Q ¬Q ¬P
T T 1 F F
T i 5 i F
T F F T F
i T 6 F T
i i 7 i i
i F 8 T F
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Affirming the Consequent 
Looking at the circumstance surveyors, we can observe that the conclusion is the same as in 
the two-valued logics: lines 1, 3 and 4 are true even if we abandon bivalence. The same 
results apply to other three-valued logics (e.g. Kleene’s, Bochvar’s). 
An identical conclusion obtains in five-valued logics. Consider a five-valued logic with 
the following truth values: unknown (U), possibly known but consistent (K), false (F), true 
(T) and inconsistent (I) (Ferreira, 2004: 134–140). With the assumptions that Modus Ponens 
and Modus Tollens have at least one substitution instance with true premises and true 
conclusion and affirming the consequent have at least one substitution instance with true 
premises and false conclusion we make the following additional arbitrary attributions of truth 
values: “1” when the antecedent is U and the consequent is U; “2” when the antecedent is U 
and the consequent is K, and so on, proceeding until the end of the truth table with the value 
24. The negation operator is the following: 
Given that, we have the following circumstance surveyors: 
Modus Ponens 
F T 3 F T
F i 9 i T
F F 4 T T
First premise Second 
premise
Conclusion
P Q If P then Q Q P
T T 1 T T
T i 5 I T
T F F F T
i T 6 T i
i i 7 i i
i F 8 F i
F T 3 T F
F i 9 i F
F F 4 F F
P ¬P
U K
K U
F T
T F
I I
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             Modus Tollens 
First premise Second 
premise
Conclusion
P Q If P then Q P Q
U U 1 U U
U K 2 U K
U F 3 U F
U T 4 U T
U I 5 U I
K U 6 K U
K K 7 K K
K F 8 K F
K T 9 K T
K I 10 K I
F U 11 F U
F K 12 F K
F F 13 F F
F T 14 F T
F I 15 F I
T U 16 T U
T K 17 T K
T F F T F
T T 18 T T
T I 19 T I
I U 20 I U
I K 21 I K
I F 22 I F
I T 23 I T
I I 24 I I
First 
premise
Second 
premise
Conclusion
P Q If P then Q ¬Q ¬P
U U 1 K K
U K 2 U K
U F 3 T K
U T 4 F K
U I 5 I K
K U 6 K U
K K 7 U U
K F 8 T U
K T 9 F U
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                      Affirming the Consequent 
K I 10 I U
F U 11 K T
F K 12 U T
F F 13 T T
F T 14 F T
F I 15 I T
T U 16 K F
T K 17 U F
T F F T F
T T 18 F F
T I 19 I F
I U 20 K I
I K 21 U I
I F 22 T I
I T 23 F I
I I 24 I I
First 
premise
Second 
premise
Conclusion
P Q
If P then 
Q
Q P
U U 1 U U
U K 2 K U
U F 3 F U
U T 4 T U
U I 5 I U
K U 6 U K
K K 7 K K
K F 8 F K
K T 9 T K
K I 10 I K
F U 11 U F
F K 12 K F
F F 13 F F
F T 14 T F
F I 15 I F
T U 16 U T
T K 17 K T
T F F F T
T T 18 T T
T I 19 I T
I U 20 U I
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Once more, the truth table of the material implication was justified. Thus, even when we have 
a many-valued conditional connective that departs from the bivalent connective of classical 
logic we still maintain the same results. Apparently, we can keep adding new truth values and 
the lines of material implication’s truth table will still be vindicated. My defence is simpler 
because it requires fewer assumptions: even if you do not believe in bivalence and the 
classical negation operator, you still have good reasons to accept material implication’s truth 
conditions. 
3. SOME POSSIBLE REPLIES AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Someone could object that a connective with more than two truth values cannot be a material 
implication since a material implication is by definition bivalent. In that case, we have 
offered an argument only for the thesis that an indicative conditional is a many-valued truth-
functional cousin of the material implication. However, the objection goes, since material 
implication’s truth conditions are the only viable truth-functional option for a conditional 
connective with two values  this should not be a surprising result. 1
The problem of this objection is that it ignores that the argument is an attempt to justify 
the lines of the truth table of the material implication and not of its many-valued cousins. Of 
course, under the assumption that we have discarded the bivalence and that Lee Archie 
argument’s works, the natural language conditionals do not have exactly the same truth 
conditions than a material implication, since we are considering many-valued connectives 
that have more truth values. Nonetheless the fact remains that under these assumptions the 
many-valued connectives preserve the truth conditions of the material implication and that 
any natural language conditional with a false antecedent or a true consequent will be true. 
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I K 21 K I
I F 22 F I
I T 23 T I
I I 24 I I
 The alternatives validate fallacies such as denying the antecedent, and are counter-intuitive. See Kleene (1967: 1
10).
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